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11 Introduction
The fact that the Global Financial Crisis, and the Great Recession it ush-
ered in, was largely unforeseen, has led to the common opinion that macro-
economic models and analysis is de￿cient in some way. Of course it has
probably always been true that businessmen, journalists and politicians have
agreed on the proposition that economists can￿ t forecast recessions. Yet we
see an enormous published literature that presents results which suggest it
is possible to do so, either with some new model or some new estimation
method e.g. Kaufman (2010), Galvao (2006), Dueker (2005), Wright (2006)
and Moneta (2005). Moreover, there seem to be no shortage of papers still
emerging that make claims along these lines. So a question that naturally
arises is how one is to reconcile the existence of an expanding literature on
predicting recessions with the scepticism noted above?
Many reasons have been given for why one might not be able to predict
recessions. One is that the economy is complex. However, many systems
such as weather are also complex, and yet the record of meteorologists seems
quite good. Another is that there are too few recessions, so one is faced with
a small number of events. Now there are more bear equity markets than
recessions, yet the extra observations available on these does not seem to
have produced a more successful prediction record of stock market crashes.
Clearly, the answer must lie elsewhere.
In this paper we argue that the problems in predicting recessions stem
from the nature of the de￿nition of a recession. Much of the literature that
claims success does not predict recessions as such. Rather it focusses upon
either whether one can predict growth in economic activity or whether one
can identify the current status on the economy - what is now often referred
to as "nowcasting" - rather than forecasting. Still other papers focus on the
ability to predict what we will call a "recession-derived event". Success in
this however often has few implications for the ability to predict a recession.
Thus our paper seeks to provide a review of the literature on predicting
recessions. The review leads to the contention that it is extremely di¢ cult
to predict recessions. Understanding why this is so leads to an appreciation
of the barriers to be faced in the task and also suggests that many of the
claims made about how the forecasting record can be improved should be
treated with scepticism. This is not to deny that some of these suggestions
might be able to improve our understanding of business cycle issues, even if
they do not improve the forecasting capacity. Moreover, being aware of the
2limits to forecasting suggests that we should focus our research on questions
that we might have a better chance of addressing e.g. whether it is possible
to predict how long a recession will last once it is initiated.
In the next section we give a de￿nition of a recession that revolves around
isolating peaks and troughs in a series that represents economic activity.
Although our presentation will concentrate upon quarterly data it can be
extended to monthly series, although there is little to be gained for an un-
derstanding of the prediction issues from doing so. Section 3 then uses that
de￿nition to explain why it is unlikely that recessions can be predicted in
either the Euro area or the US utilizing most currently available data sets.
Any improvement will have to come from access to information that captures
the future shocks that are likely to a⁄ect the economy and the origin of these
does not seem to be in the past. At this stage we slightly modify our focus
away from predicting recessions per se and ask what is the probability of
predicting negative growth in economic activity one period ahead? Because
a recession gets initiated with a period of negative growth, if such an event
cannot be predicted it will be hard to predict a recession, as the latter in-
volves studying a sequence of signs of future growth rates. We often ￿nd it
useful to concentrate on this simpler event as it avoids di¢ culties in de￿ning
exactly what a recession is.
Section 4 then asks whether the problem lies in the perspective that
was taken in section 3. In order to simplify the argument section 3 took
growth in economic activity as being determined linearly by the state of the
economy and past growth rates. It might be that the relation is a non-linear
one and thus we might want to allow for various types of non-linearity. As
an illustration Markov Switching models were ￿tted to Euro-area and U.S.
growth. Using this model to produce forecasts it is found that there is even
less ability to predict future negative growth, unless a negative growth rate
has already been observed.
Section 5 investigates what other information might be useful in predict-
ing future growth rates. Here there is a growing literature on that question,
some of which claims success for variables such as the yield spread and vari-
ous leading indicators. Some of the European and US literature also uses a
range of variables coming from micro-economic surveys, incorporating them
into multivariate models that might be utilized to predict future events. One
that has received some attention is the Qual-VAR model of Dueker (2005).
We discuss some econometric problems with this paper, and its use in fore-
casting the 2001 recession, which makes us feel that the claims for its e⁄ec-
3tiveness are perhaps exaggerated.
Finally, section 6 looks at papers working with a "recession-derivative
indicator" (RDI) e.g. Wright (2006), rather than a recession. Papers in this
literature claim to have an impressive record of predicting recessions, whereas
they are actually predicting the RDI. We show that there are two e⁄ects of
switching to an RDI perspective. Firstly, the unconditional probability of
encountering an RDI event is much higher than that of a recession - often
twice as high- and what may look like predictive success is simply an artifact
of the de￿nition. Secondly, the timing of the origin of an RDI event is very
di⁄erent to that of a recession. Mostly the event happens before a recession
and so it may look as if one has managed to predict recessions in advance,
particularly if only graphical evidence is tendered. Again, this is an artifact
of the de￿nition.
2 Recognizing a Recession
Because our discussion will involve quarterly data economic activity Yt is
mostly measured by GDP. If monthly data had been the focus one would
need to have used a number of indicators. It should be conceded that, even
in the quarterly case, one sees a use of quantities such as the unemployment
rate, industrial production and retail trade to measure economic activity.
Regardless of whether a single variable or a variety of series are utilized to
construct a measure of Yt the task is to determine where the turning points
in Yt occur. These turning points are peaks and troughs in economic activity
and they enable one to mark o⁄ periods of time spent in expansions and
contractions. It is worth noting that we will always study turning points in
yt = lnYt: The turning points are the same in both series due to log being a
monotonic transformation, but it is more convenient to work with yt, as the
changes in yt are approximately growth rates.
A program that we use to ￿nd the turning points is the BBQ program,
which derives from the philosophy set out in Bry and Boschan (1983) and
underlies much of the NBER business cycle dating philosophy. BBQ is a
WYSIWYG program and the rules used to locate a set of turning points are
as follows.
1. A peak occurs at time t if yt is greater than {yt￿1;yt￿2;yt+1;yt+2g: Thus
a peak occurred in Euro area GDP in 1980:1 as seen in the following observa-
tions on the log of Euro GDP for { y1979:3;y1979:4;y1980:1;y1980:2;y1980:3;y1980:4;y1981:1g :
4{13.8100,13.8194, 13.8288, 13.8241, 13.8235, 13.8240, 13.8250}. A trough is
de￿ned symmetrically and it is clearly identi￿ed as being at 1980:3, making
the recession of the early 1980s two quarters long. Why choose two quar-
ters on either side of the potential peak? The reason is the feeling that a
recession ( time between peak and a trough) should last for some minimal
time, otherwise recessions will be called too often. By convention this has
become 2 quarters ( or ￿ve months if one uses monthly data)1. This could
be changed if one wished. For the Euro area it would matter a great deal if
one moved to one quarter as the minimum length of a recession, since over
1970-2009 there were seven quarters in which there was negative growth in
GDP but BBQ does not identify a recession. This is also true for other coun-
tries such as Australia and the US ( in fact Australia only had one period of
negative growth during the Great Recession). The point is that a recession is
an extreme event and so some convention needs to be established about how
we recognize that the behavior of GDP is extreme enough. One might also
apply some quantitative rules e.g. the decline in GDP has to be larger than
some speci￿ed value. This might be used to eliminate some weak recessions
identi￿ed by BBQ and this is often done informally by business cycle dating
committees. It should be noted that the BBQ rule does not coincide with
that often used in the press that a recession is two consecutive periods of
negative growth, nor rules that sometimes appear in the academic literature
e.g. Fair (1993), which have a recession occurring in time t if there are two
consecutive negative growth rates in GDP in the ￿ve quarters that begin in
t: We return to these alternative de￿nitions in section 6.
2. There are other constraints that BBQ uses such as a minimal length
for a complete cycle i.e. the period from a peak to peak, but these are of
smaller importance and won￿ t detain us here.
3. Once the turning points have been isolated it is possible to determine
when the economy was in either a recession or an expansion. It is convenient
to summarize this information by designating a series St that takes the value
1 when we are in an expansion and zero when we are in recession. Thus, when
we are concerned with predicting a recession at time t; we will be asking what
the chance is that St+1 = 0? It is here that one might often prefer to work
with a series on St constructed by some business cycle dating committee,
given that such a group might be able to utilize auxiliary information that
1The NBER Dating Committee uses the ￿ve monthly rule when ￿nding the turning
points in the US economy.
5an automated program such as BBQ does not allow for. Thus BBQ identi￿es
a trough in 1993:1 but the weak growth in 1993:2 of .07% clearly led the
Euro Area Dating Committee to prefer a later date for the trough.2 For the
US, BBQ does not recognize a recession in 2001 since each negative growth
rate in GDP was followed by a positive one of larger magnitude.3 But the
NBER Dating Committee do identify a recession in 2001. Apart from these
exceptions, the correspondence between the turning points identi￿ed by BBQ
based on GDP and these "o¢ cial" dates is good. For empirical work on
Europe we will use the BBQ dates, but we will generally adopt the NBER
ones for the US, since some of the RDIs we want to investigate later focus
on the NBER-de￿ned recessions and expansions.
4. The condition for a peak can be expressed in terms of growth rates.
When that is done a peak at t occurs when {￿yt > 0;￿2yt > 0;￿yt+1 <
0;￿2yt+2 < 0g; where ￿2yt = yt￿yt￿2 = ￿yt+￿yt￿1 is six-monthly growth.
Another way of expressing this is to adopt the conventional de￿nition that a
recession starts the period after a peak while an expansion begins the period
after a trough - see Estrella and Trubin (2006). Using that perspective we
can alternatively express a turning point as a change in state viz. St =
1 ! St+1 = 0 if there is a peak at t: Thus, if {￿yt > 0;￿2yt > 0;￿yt+1 <
0;￿2yt+2 < 0g; then we have a change from expansion to recession. If these
conditions are not satis￿ed then we remain in the current state i.e. St = 1 !
St+1 = 1. Thus to know if there has been a change in state we will need to
know future information in the form of {￿yt+1 < 0;￿2yt+2 < 0g: Moreover,
the corollary is that if you know St you must have used future information
to determine it (the dating committees of course set the turning points quite
a time after they happened).
To look at this more formally we observe that the St generated by BBQ
can be written in the recursive form
St+1 = StSt￿1 [1 ￿ 1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿yt+1 + ￿yt+2 ￿ 0)]
+St (1 ￿ St￿1) (1)
+(1 ￿ St)(1 ￿ St￿1)1(￿yt+1 > 0)1(￿yt+1 + ￿yt+2 > 0);
2In fact they set it at 1993:3. This has to be debateable given that growth in that
quarter was .4%, almost stronger than what happened in 1993:4.
3In the early releases of GDP in 2003 there were three periods of successive negative
growth and so BBQ did then identify a 2001 recession.
6where 1(A) = 1 if A is true and zero otherwise.4 We wish to predict St+1:
More generally, (1) points to the fact that to predict St+1 we need to have
some idea of St;St￿1 and the future signs of ￿yt+1 and {￿yt+1+￿yt+2g: Thus
we need to indicate what information is available when predicting St+1; and
also how one is to predict St;St￿1; and the signs of ￿yt+1,{￿yt+1 + ￿yt+2g
with that information.
It is worth looking at (1) when we are interested in predicting a recession
given that, at time t; we are in an expansion i.e. St = 1;St￿1 = 1: Then it
becomes
St+1 = [1 ￿ 1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿yt+1 + ￿yt+2 ￿ 0)]
and
Pr(St+1 = 1jFt) = [1 ￿ Ef1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿yt+1 + ￿yt+2 ￿ 0)jFtg]
￿ [1 ￿ Ef1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)jFtg]
where Ft is the information available at t (including St￿1 = 1;St = 1):
Consequently,
Pr(St+1 = 0) = 1 ￿ Pr(St+1 = 1) ￿ Ef1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0jFt) = Pr(￿yt+1 ￿ 0jFt):
So an upper bound to the probability of a recession at t = 1 is found by
looking at Pr(￿yt+1 ￿ 0jFt). For expository purposes it is often simplest to
study whether we can predict the event 1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0); rather than the joint
event 1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿yt+1 + ￿yt+2 ￿ 0); and we will often do this in what
follows. But it should be borne in mind that the joint event will be harder
to predict than the single period of negative growth.
3 Predicting a Recession with State and GDP
Growth Data
We are then ultimately interested in whether a recession can be predicted at
time t+1 when we are at t i.e. in predicting whether St+1 = 0: This depends
4There is a small complication caused by completed cycles having a minimum duration
of ￿ve quarters. Only occasionally does this constraint bite. It should be observed that this
relationship shows that one does not need a Markov Switching model to predict business
cycle states. It is the de￿nition of a recession which provides the structure needed to do
the prediction.
7upon growth rates in economic activity at t + 1 and t + 2: It is necessary to
specify what information would have been available at time t that would be
useful to predict the value of St+1 (or the growth rates):5 If the growth rates
in activity were independent then knowing these past values will be of no use
in predicting the future growth rates per se. Now in many countries there
is very little persistence in growth rates of GDP e.g. the UK and Australia.
But in the US and the Euro area there is moderately strong ￿rst order serial
correlation in growth rates. Prima facie this might look advantageous but
we will see later that it is not.
It is worth getting some idea of the determinants of the probability of
a de￿ned event given a determinant. Denote Rt as a binary indicator of
the event, with Rt = 1 if it occurs and zero otherwise. Thus Rt could be a
recession or it might just be a period of negative growth. For convenience
however we will refer to it as a recession.
Consider the regression of Rt on 1 and xt: Hence the linear relation will
be
Rt ￿ ￿ R = (xt ￿ ￿ x)￿;


















T (￿ xR ￿ ￿ x)
var(xt)
where TR = # of periods in recession and ￿ xR is the average of xt over periods
spent in recession. Hence the prediction of Rt ￿ ￿ R is
^ Rt ￿ ￿ R = (xt ￿ ￿ x)
Tr
T (￿ xR ￿ ￿ x)
var(xt)
=) ^ Rt = ￿ R + (xt ￿ ￿ x)
Tr
T (￿ xR ￿ ￿ x)
var(xt)
= ￿ R(1 + (xt ￿ ￿ x)
Tr
T (￿ xR ￿ ￿ x)
var(xt)
)
5Although we will write ￿yt, St￿1 etc. as the available information we will mean all
past values of these quantities.
8Hence the probability of a recession rises above its unconditional value when
xt is below its sample mean and ￿ xR < ￿ x: Now
(￿ xR￿￿ x)
var(xt) = t￿ x=sd(xt); where
t￿ x is the t ratio that ￿ xR = ￿ x (provided xt is i:d:): Clearly the magnitude of
the probability depends upon the magnitude of the t test, the variability in
xt and the fraction of the sample that is recessions. It is possible to gener-
alize the above to handle more than one determinant but for a conceptual
understanding it su¢ ces to deal with only one.
Suppose we knew that St = 1 and St￿1 = 1 i.e. we were in an expansion
at the time the prediction is to be made. Then
Pr(St+1 = 0jFt) = Ef1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿yt+1 + ￿yt+2 ￿ 0)jFtg
= g(Ft)
The functional relation g(￿) will generally be non-linear for two reasons. One
is that the conditional expectations will be non-linear in Ft as they must lie
between zero and unity, but it may also be that ￿yt+j (j = 1;2) depends
in a non-linear way upon Ft: In most instances g(￿) will not be analyti-
cally derivable. If the number of elements in Ft is limited then one can use
non-parametric methods to estimate g(￿) as in Harding and Pagan (2011).
Because we are estimating a probability it might be desirable to make the
g(￿) function monotonic and Harding (2010) shows how one can adjust the
non-parametric estimates to impose monotonicity in a reasonably simple way.
Sometimes, for example if the mapping between ￿yt+1 and ￿yt+2 and Ft is
linear, then one can evaluate Ef1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿yt+1 + ￿yt+2 ￿ 0)jFtg by
simulation methods. An example would be if ￿yt followed an AR(1) process
of the form
￿yt+1 = ￿ + ￿￿yt + ￿"t; "t~iidN (0;1): (2)
and Ft = ￿yt:
As foreshadowed earlier we will focus upon the ability to predict a nega-
tive growth rate i.e. Pr(￿yt+1 < 0jFt): This equals Ef1(￿yt+1 < 0)j￿yt): In
the literature it is often that case that E(1(￿yt+1 < 0)j￿yt) is assumed to
be ￿(￿yt); where ￿(￿) is the c.d.f for the standard normal. In Harding and
Pagan (2011) we argue that there is a strong case for a non-parametric ￿t,
but here we will use the Probit form for simplicity, since the non-parametric
estimate of E(1(￿yt+1 < 0)j￿yt￿1) was much the same as that from a Probit
model. With other conditioning variables this might not be true. Figure
1 then looks at the ability to predict 1(￿yt+1 < 0) when information ￿yt












 Fig 1 Prob Negative Growth and Recession Periods for Euro Area
is available for the Euro Area. The grey shaded areas are Euro-Area reces-
sions. Table 1 then gives the probabilities as one moves through the 1992/3
recession.
Table 1 : Probabilities of Predicting E(￿yt+1 < 0j￿yt)
Euro Area 1992/3 Recession






This is a typical pattern - the ￿rst period of the recession is predicted












 Fig 2 Lag Gwth: Prob Neg Growth and Recessions for US
with very low probability but then rises as the recession gets underway. Thus,
at the time the recession emerges i.e. St+1 = 0; we would have prediction
probabilities (Pr(￿yt+1j￿yt)) in the various Euro recessions of .09 (1974:4),
.06 (1980:2), .03 (1992:2), and .08 (2008:2). If we think that a critical value
here is .5 ( a fairly common choice) then none of the ￿ve recessions would
have been predicted using the the most favorable information, in the sense
that it is highly unlikely that ￿yt would be available one period before the
recession begins.6 To put these numbers into context, since 11.6% of the
time was spent in recession, if you just allocated a value of .116 every period
you would be doing better than trying to exploit the information available
in growth rates7. A similar result holds for the US, with the probabilities
varying between .06 and .27 for the recessions since 1953. It should be noted
that the unconditional probability of a recession over the period 1953/2 to
2009/3 is .16.
Now an examination of Pr(￿yt+1 ￿ 0j￿yt) is needed. The fact that
there is positive serial correlation ( .35) in GDP growth in the Euro area
militates against successfully predicting ￿yt+1 < 0; since a positive growth
6The issue of deciding on a threshold is a di¢ cult one and something we will deal with
in a later version of this paper. The choice raises similar issues to balancing Type 1 and
Type 2 errors in hypothesis testing.
7Using ￿yt￿1;￿yt￿2 and ￿yt￿3 as regressors does not change this conclusion.
11in the previous period points towards it being positive again. Indeed, the
correlation of  t = 1(￿yt+1 < 0) with  t￿1 is .33.8 Hence it is very di¢ cult
to predict negative growth coming out of an expansion, and it is only after the
recession has arrived that the strong dependence will make the probability
of ￿yt+1 <0 substantial. Using the Euro area data we can compute a non-
parametric estimate of the Pr(￿yt+1 < 0j￿yt) and, for a small value of
￿yt close to zero, the probability is .16 - so only a little bigger than the
unconditional probability9.
Now, as mentioned above, the choice of ￿yt as information available to
forecast the event ￿yt+1 < 0 is problematic. It is unlikely that one would
know ￿yt when the forecast had to be made: In practice we rarely know what
the growth rate in the current quarter is e.g. in Australia the best we would
get would be GDP growth for t ￿ 1 in quarter t. Even then this quantity
can be subject to substantial revision and even a possible sign change. In
terms of forecasting recessions this has two consequences. One is that it will
no longer be the case that St can be known. If it was the case that St￿1 was
known to be unity, then a positive ￿yt would mean that St = 1; since the
peak in yt would not be at t ￿ 1: But if we don￿ t know ￿yt then it might be
negative. Since a negative growth can occur in an expansion, whether St is
either 0 or 1 will not be known, and so we will need to predict this as well
as ￿yt+j(j = 1;2):
To see the e⁄ect of being restricted to only knowing ￿yt￿1; it is useful
to look at Ef1(￿yt+1j￿yt)g and Ef1(￿yt+1j￿yt￿1)g one quarter into a reces-
sion. The probabilities fromthe European data are then {.62,.11},{.31,.11},{.38,.10},
and {.25,.11} respectively. The poor prediction record of the second set of
information i.e. ￿yt￿1 comes from the fact that, even after the recession has
started, it is not yet known whether there has been a negative growth rate.
Thus that piece of extra information would have a signi￿cant impact on the
ability to predict negative growth. Of course when it comes to predicting
recessions the situation is even more complex, as it becomes necessary to
predict St as this would not be known. Thus we might think that, at best,
the information available for predicting St+1 would be St and ￿yt and, at
8Under a normality assumption for ￿yt Kedem(1980) gave an expression for the serial
correlation coe¢ cients of 1(￿yt+1 > 0) in terms of the serial correlation coe¢ cients of
￿yt:
9The probability is identical to E(1(￿yt+1 < 0)j￿yt) given the binary nature of the
event 1(￿yt+1 < 0); so we can estimate the probability with a non-parametric estimate
of the conditional mean of 1(￿yt+1 < 0):
12worst, it would be St￿2;￿yt￿1: This problem of trying to come up with the
latest GDP growth outcome is often referred to as "now-casting", and one
can see that it is important to get a good estimate.
If St is not known we need to make an estimate of it in order to predict
recessions. To see how this is done lag (1) by one period to get
St = St￿1St￿2 [1 ￿ 1(￿yt ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+1 ￿ 0)] (3)
+St￿1 (1 ￿ St￿2) (4)
+(1 ￿ St￿1)(1 ￿ St￿2)1(￿yt > 0)1(￿2yt+1 > 0)
Substituting (3) into (1), after some rearrangement we would obtain
St+1 = St￿1St￿2 [1 ￿ 1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+2 ￿ 0)][1 ￿ 1(￿yt ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+1 ￿ 0)]
+St￿1 (1 ￿ St￿2)[1 ￿ 1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+2 < 0)]
+(1 ￿ St￿1)(1 ￿ St￿2)1(￿yt > 0)1(￿2yt+1 < 0)
+(1 ￿ St￿1)1(￿yt+1 > 0)1(￿2yt+2 > 0)
￿(1 ￿ St￿1)(1 ￿ St￿2)1(￿yt+1 > 0)1(￿2yt+2 > 0)1(￿yt > 0)1(￿2yt+1 > 0)
Hence, given that we were in an expansion in t ￿ 1 and t ￿ 2 i.e. St￿1 =
1;St￿2 = 1; these are in Ft and we have both
St+1 = [1 ￿ 1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+2 ￿ 0)][1 ￿ 1(￿yt ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+1 ￿ 0)]
and
Pr(St = 0jFt) = Ef1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+2 ￿ 0) + 1(￿yt ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+1 ￿ 0)
￿1(￿yt+1 ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+2 ￿ 0)1(￿yt ￿ 0)1(￿2yt+1 ￿ 0)jFt)
= h(Ft):
Clearly h(￿) will be di⁄erent to g(￿): Again this can be evaluated numerically.
A similar expression can be found if only St￿2 is known.
4 Predicting Negative Growth: Can Non-linear
Models of GDP Growth Help?
The previous section drew attention to studying Pr(￿yt+1 < 0jFt) as a ￿rst
test of the ability to predict a recession. So far little mention has been made
13of the relationship between current and past growth, but implicitly this has
been taken to be linear. One might allow ￿yt to also depend upon the state
of the economy at t￿j, St￿j; and this is often mentioned as a possibility. Of
course, since St￿j depends on growth rates in GDP, it is still the case that
the relationship is between growth rates. But this ignores the fact that St
is a parsimonious summary of these and that it also introduces some non-
linear structure through the fact that St depends on the sign of the growth
rate and not the magnitude. Fitting a Probit model to 1(￿yt+1 < 0) for
the Euro Area; with explanatory variables ￿yt￿1 and St￿1; suggests that the
probabilities are much the same as if one had just used ￿yt￿1. This is also
true of the US if one uses the St￿1 determined by BBQ.10
An alternative modi￿cation is to allow for GDP growth to depend in a
non-linear way on its past history. Many non-linear models for ￿yt have been
proposed, and one often sees comments that these produce better forecasts
of GDP growth than linear models. A popular one that is used in a lot
in the business cycle literature is that of a Hidden Layer Markov Chain,
introduced into econometrics by Hamilton (1979). This is often given the
shortened descriptor of a Markov Switching (MS) model, with the simplest
variant having the form
￿yt = ￿t + ￿￿yt￿1 + ￿"t (5)
￿t = ￿1￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿0 (6)
pij = Pr(￿t = ij￿t￿1 = j); (7)
where ￿t is a binary random variable that follows a ￿rst order Markov process
with transition probabilities pij and "t is n:i:d(0;1): More complicated mod-
els are available but we doubt that these improve the recession predictions
- see for example the discussion in Engel et al (2005). Although the MS
model in (5)￿(7) could be ￿tted to the Euro area it was clear that it was an
inappropriate model since the sample mean of the 1(￿yt+1 < 0) produced by
simulating it was .44 versus the .12 in the data. Hence it was producing far
too many negative growth rates. If one just ￿tted a linear AR(1) and simu-
lated it this probability was .11. So one would have to reject this MS model.
It is a curious fact that almost no analysis is given of the ￿t of MS models.
10BBQ St has a timing di⁄erence to the NBER St in 1974/5 since the NBER recession
starts in 1974/1 while BBQ has it at 1974/3. Of course the NBER dating was not available
when predicting GDP growth in 1974/2.
14This simple test might be a good way of determining whether they provide
a satisfactory description of the data, particularly if they are to be used for
"business cycle analysis". For the US one gets a much better description of
the data with the MS model, although even here there is evidence that the
model does not ￿t the data, since the sample mean of 1(￿yt+1 < 0) in the
data is .18, but it was .11 using data simulated from the estimated model.
In any event the MS model would predict that E(1(￿yt+1 < 0) j￿yt) would
be around .13 when growth ￿yt was around zero i.e. it is still highly un-
likely that one can predict a negative growth in activity with that non-linear
model.
5 Predicting Negative Growth and Recessions:
Using Multivariate Information to Model
GDP Growth
So far we have looked at whether one can predict the sign of ￿yt+1 with past
growth and state information and found that this is not likely. The fact that
we are looking for the shocks that cause movements in future growth suggests
that more success might be had by concentrating on variables that contain
some forward-looking information. The fact that this is a crucial search can
be dramatized by looking at the recessions emerging out of a model with
credit and an external ￿nance premium by Gilchrist et al (2009). In their
model the cycle is around 18 quarters long ( this is for per capita GDP). But
if the contemporaneous shocks are excluded from output growth, since they
are items that are not predictable, then cycles would be around 38 quarters
long on average i.e. the shocks reduce cycle length by almost 5 years, showing
how crucial they are to outcomes, and why predicting the business cycle is
really about predicting future shocks.
A variable often used in an attempt to improve predictive power is the
spread between long and short interest rates and there is now a large litera-
ture suggesting that such a spread variable is good at doing so e.g. Estrella
and Mishkin (1978). There are also models that use multi-variate information
to make predictions. Thus Canova and Ciccarelli (2004) use a VAR which
is estimated across a number of economies. One that has attracted substan-
tial attention is the Qual-VAR model of Dueker (2005) in which a vector of
variables including St;￿yt and interest rates are modelled as a latent vari-
15able VAR. This structure is then used to generate forecasts of St+1: In the
following sub-sections we look at the utility of various spreads and leading
indicators, as well as the Qual-VAR model, for predicting negative growth
and recessions.
5.1 The Predictive Utility of Spreads
It has often been suggested that the spread between the ten year bond rate
and the three month bill rate is informative for anticipating recessions. In-
deed there are hundreds of articles looking at this for a variety of countries.
Here we consider how useful it is for predicting negative growth one quarter
ahead.
5.1.1 For Negative Growth in the Euro Area
Moneta (2005) suggested that the spread was a good predictor of Euro Area
recessions, where he de￿ned a recession as two periods of negative growth and
lagged the spread four periods. Figure 3 shows the predictions from a Probit
model of negative growth over the period 1971:1-2008:4 using spread data
constructed for the Euro area by Anderson et al (2007). With the exception
of the 1974/5 recession there seems little to be gained from using the spread
as an indicator of a forthcoming recession. The most striking di⁄erence is
in 1982 where Moneta￿ s ￿gure 1 ( p276) records a probability of a recession
above .8. What is peculiar about this is that he records a double dip recession
in the Euro Area in the early 1980s, similar to US experience, but this does
not appear in the standard recession dates for the Euro area. Moreover in
the GDP ￿gures we utilize there is no negative growth in the years 1982/3,
so one would not record a recession using his two periods of negative growth
rule.
5.1.2 For Negative Growth in the US
In what follows we look at the US case as the predictive e¢ cacy of spreads
for that country￿ s recessions has been a constant theme in the literature. As
before, focussing on the ￿rst period the recession begins in, we get proba-
bilities of negative growth for the nine recessions between 1954:2 and 2008:4
of .23, .21, .33, .51, .56, .52, .17, .38, and .24. The information used in this
prediction was the spread lagged two periods ( the best for predicting St+1
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according to Estrella and Mishkin). The estimated Probit model shows a
probability of negative growth of .31 when there is a zero spread, rising to
.51 when the spread is -100 basis points. The latter is a very rare occur-
rence in US history. In fact, with the exception of 1973:3, the only other
time the term structure inverted to such an extent was during the "Volcker
experiment" over 1979-1982, when the Fed targeted money supply. In only
the 1974/5 and double-dip recessions of the early 1980s would the spread
have managed to indicate a negative growth rate. Figure 4 shows a plot of
Pr(￿yt+1jspt￿2) from 1953/2 until 2009/2.
If one looks at the pseudo-R2 from the Probit model one ￿nds it is .07
(with GDP growth), .16 (when the spread is added to growth as a regressor),
.18 (with growth, spread and St￿2), and .24 ( with growth, spread and St). So
spreads do contribute but not a great deal. We introduced St as suggested by
Dueker (1997), and much applied research since then has used it e.g. Kauppi
and Saikkonen (2008). Of course, as explained earlier, St is not available
for prediction purposes, and to construct it one needs to know future growth
outcomes. Because it is a function of future outcomes, it should not therefore
be surprising that it will produce a much better ￿t to future data. In order
to do a proper comparison it is not S(t) that we should use but the expected
value of S(t) conditional upon whatever information is available at t, and we
have discussed how to compute this earlier. If one does that there is only a
marginal improvement. One recommendation therefore is that Probit models
which include St as regressors can easily produce misleading accounts of the
explanatory power of spreads, and so the inclusion of the variable in these
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relations needs to be treated with caution. Because St would be known to
be St￿2 if both ￿yt and ￿yt￿1 were positive ( as the peak in yt could not be
at t ￿ 2 and t ￿ 1); using St as a regressor utilizes information that ￿yt and
￿yt￿1 have di⁄erent signs.
Another spread that has been mentioned as a possible indicator is that of
the spread between the yields on Baa bonds and the 10 year bond rate e.g.
Gilchrist et al. (2009). As Figure 5 reveals, with the exception of the last
recession, this spread does not have much predictive success.
5.2 The Predictive Utility of Some Euro Area Activity
Indicators
We have seen papers that suggest there are Euro area indicators that might
be used for predicting recessions. But the data used was not available to us.
Camacho and Perez-Quiros (2010) is an exception. Their indicators begin at
various times, but the earliest is in 1991, and the data available to us ￿nished
in 2007, so there was only one recession over the sample period. Some of the
indicators were proprietary and so not deposited in the Journal of Applied
Econometrics data base. Hard indicators related to various forms of GDP
estimates for quarters before the one being forecast ( ￿ ash, ￿rst and second
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revisions) as well as forecasts and series on employment, sales and exports.
Since we have already argued that exact knowledge of past GDP growth
would add little to the predictive ability we ignore these. Soft indicators
were composed of various survey type information. The series available to
be used were BNB, ESI, IFO, EMP, EX and IPI ( Table 1 of their paper give
the acronyms).
Table 2 looks at the ability of the Euro-sting indicators to predict the only
recession in the sample period. To get these predictions we ￿tted a Probit
model to the binary variable recording negative growth and the series of the
previous paragraph. The recession ran from 1992/2-1993/1, but we present
some probabilities before and after the recession. In the Probit model the
only signi￿cant coe¢ cient was that of IFO (Germany IFO Business Climate
Index).












One can see from this that there are quite a few false alarms and the
pattern we saw earlier regarding the inability to predict the ￿rst quarter of
recessions is still present. It is possible that one can improve these results by
some smoothing of the individual series, but one would really want to have a
longer history of them so one can assess their utility based on their capacity
to predict earlier recessions. Because the 2008 recession did not begin until
the second quarter, none of the indicators in the data base related to that,
and so we were not able to do what would be a useful check using a second
observed recession. It should also be observed that in 2003:2 there was a
negative quarter of growth, but the indicators only showed a probability
of .11, slightly above the unconditional probability of .09 over the sample
period.
5.3 The Predictive Utility of Some US Indicators
Two series that have been suggested as having the potential for predicting
recessions are the Reserve Bank of Philadelphia index developed by Aruoba
et al (2009) (ADS) and the Conference Board composite leading indicator
series (CBLI). The latter has a long history, albeit with rather mixed success,
but there has been a recent claim by Berge and Jorda (2010) that it is a good
predictor and certainly superior to ADS.
There are two ways one might look at the probability of negative growth
with the ADS index. If Rt = 1(￿yt < 0) one might estimate the Probit
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model Pr(Rt = 1jADSt) = ￿(￿ + ￿ADSt); where ADSt is the value of the
index available just before the quarter. The other would be to estimate
Pr(Rt = 1jADSt) = ￿(￿(ADSt + :8)); as it is often the case that the value
of ￿:8 is regarded as a threshold value for whether one is likely to enter a
recession or not. We will refer to these as Models I and II. The problem with
using Model II is that the threshold of -:8 was probably chosen by noting that
this was the threshold value such that all recessions in the period before 2008
would have been predicted perfectly. Because of that we would expect Model
II to feature a high probability of predicting negative growth. The only real
test of the model then would be the ability to predict the 2008 recession and
here the ￿rst-period growth probability prediction was just .31. If one decided
that the data should decide the threshold ( Model I ) then the probability
of the 2008 recession would be .32. Of course Model I does produce lower
probabilities in general since it has not been designed to produce high ones.
It is what is contained in Figure 6. We should note that the Model II index
produces some very high probabilities of negative growth away from recession
times e.g. in 1989:3 it was .5, 1992:1 it was .42 and in 2003:2 it was .46. It is
also the case that this index has an unconditional probability of a negative
growth rate of .21 versus the .135 of the data, whereas the Model I index
matches this.
Figure 7 presents the same graph but using the CBLI index. It is not
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entirely clear how to use the index. Berge and Jorda originally indicate that
it is the annual growth that is used but later say "we use this procedure to
predict the probability of recession from 1960 to 2010 using contemporaneous
LEI data". The latter suggests that it might be quarterly growth which is
used. Since this has been a common transformation of the CBLI - see Filardo
(1999) - we used it in Figure 7. Indeed, the prediction performance was better
with this than with the annual growth measure. But it is clear that the results
we get are nowhere near as impressive as they report. We also note that the
ADS index is a better predictor than the CBLI, as seen in Fig 8. Here we ￿t
a Logit rather than Probit as that seems to be what they suggest they do.
225.4 Qual VAR
Dueker(2005) described a Qual-VAR which has the (simpli￿ed) form
zt = ￿yyzt￿1 + ￿yz t￿1 + "t (8)
 t = ￿zyzt￿1 + ￿zz t￿1 + ￿t (9)
￿t = 1( t > 0);￿t = St (10)
where zt is a vector of observable variables,  t is a latent variable describ-
ing economic activity and the shocks "t;vt are normally and independently
distributed with a zero expectation. zt; t follow a VAR(1) in (8) and (9).
Basically one can think of this as a model in which the "level of activity" is
captured by a latent variable  t: The NBER Dating Committee are assumed
to express opinions about the variable  t through their published decisions
about whether the economy is in an expansion or a contraction (St); and
that is described in (10): This model is then estimated using data on zt and
St: The values of St determine what distribution one should draw  t from.
Speci￿cally, at time t; if we observe that St = 1; a draw is made from the
truncated distribution  tj( t > 0). Because St have been formed by the
NBER after recessions and expansions have occurred, St should be related
either directly to zt or variables that are correlated with it. Thus St is a
forward-looking endogenous variable, but Dueker e⁄ectively treats it as if it
was exogenous. To see this note that the implications of the model above are
E(￿tjzt￿1; t￿1) = Pr( t > 0jzt￿1; t￿1)
= ￿(￿zyzt￿1 + ￿zz t￿1)
so that, adopting a linear approximation for exposition,
E(￿tjzt￿1; t￿1) = azt￿1 + b t￿1;
produces an explanation of ￿t of the form
￿t = St = azt￿1 + b t￿1 + ￿t;
where ￿t = ￿t ￿E(￿tjzt￿1; t￿1): Inverting this equation gives  t￿1 = 1
b(St ￿
azt￿1 ￿ ￿t) so that the model for zt becomes
zt = czt￿1 + dSt + ￿t: (11)
23Consequently, even though St did not appear explicitly in the original VAR,
it was implicitly there because of the presence of the latent variable  t￿1:
Now if ￿zy = 0 we know from Kedem (1980) that ￿t will be an in￿nite
dimensional Markov Chain whose parameters depend only upon ￿zz; and so
the combination of (11) and the stationary process for St will e⁄ectively be
the system that is being estimated. Conditioning upon St raises the issue
of whether St actually equals ￿t: We know that there will be an estimate
of ￿t that can be generated from {zt￿jg1
j=0; but whether that corresponds
to the way that the NBER construct St from zt is problematic. There is
probably some speci￿cation for the  t process that will lead to a dating rule
using zt that will agree with the NBER states but whether it is the one in
the Qual-VAR is another matter. Consequently, this di¢ culty points to the
need to check for speci￿cation errors in the latent variable part of the Qual-
VAR. In any case it is clear that the fact that St is being treated as if it
is exogenous, when it actually depends on future values of zt; will lead to
inconsistent estimation of d unless one recognizes that dependence:
A more direct solution to this issue which uses the nature of the St in (1),
is to de￿ne yt in that equation as the latent variable  t: We then have the
VAR system
zt = ￿yyzt￿1 + ￿yz t￿1 + "t (12)
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: (14)
The VAR in (12)-(14) incorporates both a latent variable and some non-
linear structure and has some similarities to DSGE models with forward
looking expectations. Estimation can be done by simulation methods. The
simplest estimation approach would be to use indirect estimation and various
auxiliary models could be used.
Dueker (2005) reports an application of his Qual-VAR to predicting the
recession of 2001. The task was to forecast 2000:4-2003:3. Dueker assumes
that St = 1 in 2000:3. It is necessary to have a way of generating Etzt+j
over the forecast period: One possibility is to produce forecasts of zt using an
AR(5) in zt: Another is to use the broader set of variables in Dueker￿ s paper
and take the forecasts of the spread to be from a VAR(5) in GDP growth,
in￿ ation, the spread and an interest rate. We use both below.
24Table 3 shows the probability of a recession over the period 2000:4-2003:3
given that the information used is just the knowledge of St in 2000:1 and
2000:2 along with the yield spread up to and including 2000:3 (as well as the
other variables in the case of the VAR).














Comparing these to the results in Dueker (Table 2, p 100) we see that
the pattern is the same but the latter reports a maximum probability of .57,
which is a very high probability given such a weak recession (indeed Dueker
notes that the Qual-VAR forecast of GDP growth never becomes negative).
We were not able to replicate his Table 2 probabilities with the program
Dueker supplied to us, getting instead a maximum probability of .55 and a
probability in 2003:3 of .32, but these seem reasonably consistent.
To understand why our estimates are smaller consider ￿rst the comparison
between the AR and VAR. The VAR produces higher probabilities because it
features three forecasts of the spread that are negative, with values of -38,-34
and -2 basis points, whereas the AR never has any negative forecast, although
there is one quarter of a small positive value. Since Dueker utilizes a VAR in
his work one would therefore expect a probability of at least .5. It should be
said that the AR produces a much better forecast of the actual path of the
spread than the VAR, as there are no negative spreads ex-post in the forecast
period. So it is not clear whether one gets a large probability of a recession
simply due to an incorrect forecast of the spread over the recession. It would
seem important that one would provide information on exactly what causes
the probability of a recession to rise, and should be able to do this with the
25multivariate model that is used, rather than just treating it as a black box.
The other source of di⁄erence is that in 2003:3 the probability of a reces-
sion from the Qual-VAR is .29 which is high compared to the unconditional
probability of .17 in the data. This suggests that the model has a tendency to
assign a high probability to a recession. If we extend the forecast period for
the AR and VAR models to 25 periods, the probability of a recession would
be given as .174 i.e. both models return to the unconditional mean of St as
the forecast. In contrast, simulating out the Qual-VAR produces an uncon-
ditional forecast of the probability of a recession of .39.11 One problem may
be that in the simulations used to do the Bayesian forecasts involve unstable
VARs and these were retained provided the maximum root was less than
1.02. In a sense this is a speci￿cation test since the forecast should return to
the unconditional mean in a stationary context, and St will be a stationary
random variable. Thus the Qual-VAR does not seem to have this property
and directs attention to the possibility of speci￿cation errors in it based on
treating St as exogenous that were mentioned earlier. The methodology of
the Qual-VAR seems not to have been well documented so predictions from
it are more like those from a judgement rather than something that can be
re-produced.
6 Changing The Event De￿ning Recessions
and Turning Points
There are two ways that this can happen. In one approach a variety of
series might be combined together to measure the level of economic activity.
Many suggestions have been made e.g. the level of unemployment as well
as industrial production. Indeed, the NBER St involve an analysis of the
turning points of a number of series and this information is then combined
in an unknown way by the NBER Dating Committee to produce the ￿nal
11In an econbrowser blog http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2008/02/how_to_balance.html
Deuker reports what seem to be probabilties of St+1 being zero in the 2001 recession of
around .42, which seems more in line with our ￿nding. In his 12-period horizon forecast
the probability of .17 is close to the unconditional forecast. There is no explanation of
how the Qual VAR has been adjusted to produce such di⁄erent results from that given in
Deuker (2005). We also note that in the internet piece Dueker takes .35 to be the critical
value that one compares the predicted probability to when deciding if a recession is being
forecast, which again raises the issue of what is an appropriate threshold.
26recession and expansion dates. Coincident indices generally combine together
a number of series with ￿xed weights, while many factor models aiming to
extract a common factor from a variety of series use a set of weights that
may be varying. Obviously, it cannot be any easier to predict an indicator
based on a variety of series than a single one, since one now has to forecast
the sign of future growth in many series to ￿nd their turning points.
A di⁄erent approach is to re-de￿ne the recession event. We will refer
to these as a "recession-derivative indicator", RDI. A number of papers
that suggest high probabilities of predicting a recession have used RDIs.
One example that is often cited is Wright (1996). Wright has an RDI
(RWt) taking the value one if an NBER de￿ned recession happens in the
next four quarters and zero otherwise. To see how this a⁄ects outcomes
take the following series for St￿{1;1,1;1;1;0;0;0;1;1;1;1g - which produces
Rt = 1 ￿ St = f0;0;0;0;0;1;1;1;0;0;0;0g: The binary numbers here corre-
spond to when the NBER de￿ne expansions and recessions. The RDI used
by Wright is then RWt = 1(fRt+j = 1g4
j=1) and, for the St above, it will be
RWt ={0;1;1;1;1;1;1;0;?;?;?;?g; where ? indicates that a decision can￿ t be
made as not enough future information is available. It is clear from this that
the mean of RWt is di⁄erent from that for Rt i.e. the unconditional proba-
bility that Rt = 1 is much lower than the probability that RWt = 1 ( for the
U.S. it is .15 versus .28 over the period 1953:2-2008:4): If one then describes
a high Pr(RWt = 1jFt) as "predicting a recession", it can look as if there is
much greater predictive success, but it is an artifact of the re-de￿nition of
the event being predicted.
Note that the rise in probability comes because expansions are not treated
symmetrically with recessions. Thus, for the seventh observation in the Rt
sequence, the following four values for Rt are {1;0;0;0g; and RW7 was taken
to be unity because of the fact that R8 = 1: But, given that the quadruple
fR8;R9;R10;R11g = {1;0;0;0g largely consists of expansion periods, it might
seem more appropriate that RW7 = 0: Except for the instances in which
ties occur, wherein RW might be either one or zero e.g. with the quadru-
ple {0,0,1,1}, treating expansions and contractions symmetrically would just
mean that RWj = fRj￿4g: In this instance the probabilities of Rt = 1 and
the resulting ( symmetric) RDI, RWt = 1; would be the same. Another
important e⁄ect of moving to RWt is that there is a timing change. In the
example above consider predicting whether RW7 = 1: Because this is e⁄ec-
tively the second period into a recession, comparing it with the Rt outcomes
will make it look as if one has managed to predict the recession in advance,












 Fig 9 Int Spread: Prob Wright RDI=1 and Recessions for US
but again it is an artifact of changing the event being predicted.
One can see these e⁄ects in a number of ways. First suppose we ￿t the
same model to Rt: Then {Pr(Rt+1 = 1jspt￿2);P(RWt+1 = 1jspt￿2)g for the
recessions between 1954 and 2009 would be
f:22;:45g;f:21;:41g;f:33;:66g;f:49;:89g;f:54;:93g
f:50;:89g;f:17;:31g;f:37;:75g;f:24;:47g:
So the move from explaining recessions to an RDI has essentially doubled
the probabilities, as noted above. The switch in timing also mentioned can
be seen in Figure 9.
Another RDI used by Fair (1993), Anderson and Vahid (2001), and Gal-
vao (2006) is similar, except that it de￿nes a recession starting at t if the ￿ve
quarters starting at t have two successive periods of negative growth. One can
see that the RDI formed this way will be R￿
t = f1;1;0;0;0;0;0;1;?:?;?;?g:
Again the timing has been changed and the unconditional probability of the
recession de￿ned event will likely be higher than for that describing reces-
sions, Rt:
Canova and Ciccarelli (2004) look at turning points but they de￿ne a
peak and trough in the growth rates and so are looking at a growth rate
cycle. Of course this means that one is interested in whether ￿2yt etc are
negative, not ￿yt. Thus predictability of a turning point in the series of
growth rates would involve a "￿rst period test" of Pr(￿yt+1 ￿ ￿yt < 0jFt):
Suppose Ft = ￿yt: Now, if ￿yt had a unit root, then ￿yt would have no
28predictive power for the event 1(￿yt+1 ￿￿yt < 0) but, if it was white noise,
then there is quite a bit. For the US regressing 1(￿yt+1 ￿ ￿yt < 0) against
￿yt gives an R2 of .24.
7 Conclusion
In response to the widespread criticism that macro-economists failed to pre-
dict the global recession coming from the Global Financial Crisis, we look
at whether recessions can be predicted. The paper starts with a formula
describing the evolution of the binary states summarizing expansions and
contraction periods and uses this to suggest that a useful way to proceed is
to ask whether it is possible to predict negative growth in economic activity.
Some simple linear and non-linear models are ￿rst used to do this. These
suggest that it is very di¢ cult to predict a recession and it is only after it is
underway that the prediction probability will be high. Finally, as the formula
for state evolution indicates, to forecast a turning point in economic activity
one needs to predict future shocks, and we consider a range of indicators
designed to do this for the Euro Area and the U.S. The paper concludes
by examining a literature that forecasts what we term recession-derived in-
dicators. This can often be done quite well but we argue that it has few
implications for forecasting recessions.
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